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The Social Life of Bitcoin 





This paper challenges the notion that Bitcoin is ‘trust-free’ money by highlighting the 
social practices, organizational structures and utopian ambitions that sustain it. At the 
paper’s heart is the paradox that if Bitcoin succeeds in its own terms as an ideology, it will 
fail in practical terms as a form of money. The main reason for this is that the new 
currency is premised on the idea of money as a ‘thing’ that must be abstracted from 
social life in order for to be protected from manipulation by bank intermediaries and 
political authorities. The image is of a fully mechanized currency that operates over and 
above social life. In practice, however, the currency has generated a thriving community 
around its political ideals, relies on a high degree of social organization in order to be 
produced, has a discernible social structure, and is characterized by asymmetries of 
wealth and power that not dissimilar from the mainstream financial system. Unwittingly, 












On 13 August 2014, a five-minute video was posted on YouTube called “The 
Declaration of Bitcoin’s Independence”.1 “When we say Bitcoin”, the accompanying 
note explained, “we mean the idea: the birth of cryptocurrency”. The note continued: 
“We know it’s not perfect. But we’re not after perfection, we’re after progression. We’re 
after a way out. And we will not stop”. The video consisted of a series of talking heads 
from varied Bitcoin evangelists and luminaries such as Roger Ver, Jeff Berwick, Kristov 
Atlas and Trace Meyer, all reading segments from a single text.2 Bitcoin is more than a 
currency, was the central message: it is an “animal of anonymity” that “basks in shadow”. 
“Bitcoin is sovereignty. Bitcoin is renaissance. Bitcoin is ours. Bitcoin is.” Bitcoin was 
trading at US$5443 on the day that video was posted. Five months later, on 14 January 
2015, with the price at US$177, Bloomberg Business carried the headline “Bitcoin Has Been 
Getting Obliterated,”4 while Business Insider opted for “Bitcoin is Getting Annihilated”.5 
Both articles, along with countless others published at the time, expressed Bitcoin-related 
schadenfreude by recounting a customary list of Bitcoin flaws: the system’s alleged 
vulnerability to hacking and fraud, its associations with criminality, and the uncertainties 
generated by price volatility. Finally, on 29 May 2015, Ross Ulbricht, the erstwhile ‘pirate 
king’ of Silk Road, was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, having been 
convicted four months earlier for crimes ranging from selling narcotics, through money 
laundering, to maintaining an “ongoing criminal enterprise”. 
 
These three events seem to be part of a single underlying narrative about Bitcoin: a story 
of the currency’s downfall, a cautionary tale of political hubris, financial ineptitude and 
underlying criminality. The Bitcoin game is finally up, it seems, and the assorted 
libertarians, anarchists, investors, monetary activists, techno-geeks and criminals who 
were celebrating the benefits to personal freedom and empowerment that would 
inevitably accrue from Bitcoin’s mere existence – “Bitcoin is” – just a few months earlier 
can now be safely ignored. But in their very juxtaposition, these three events demonstrate 
something interesting and significant about Bitcoin. While the Declaration of Bitcoin 
Independence focused mainly on the new currency’s political significance – “Bitcoin is 
inherently anti-establishment, anti-system, and anti-state” – the annihilation story homed 
in principally on Bitcoin’s potential as a financial asset: “Some people are beginning to 
worry that bitcoin is stuck in a self-reinforcing negative price cycle”, warned Business 
Insider. Ulbricht’s conviction and imprisonment, on the other hand, seemed to many to 
be a reflection of how much of a threat to the state’s legitimacy, and the efficacy of its 
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monetary infrastructure, that Bitcoin itself had arguably come to pose. In one sense the 
events appear to belong to independent narratives: the Declaration had nothing to say 
about price and investment; the obliteration articles made no reference to politics, 
sovereignty and the state; and the Silk Road conviction focused on outright criminality. 
But Bitcoin is fascinating precisely because it demonstrates many of the contradictions 
and confusions that characterize money, and its relationship to law and the state, in 
general. Bitcoin is both a symptom of increasing monetary pluralism in the advanced 
capitalist societies, and an embodiment of monetary diversity in its own right. Like 
money itself, Bitcoin is multi-faceted, politically contested and sociologically rich in its 
functions and meanings. There is not one Bitcoin, but several (a point which, as I argue 
below, is all the more noteworthy given the theory behind it). My aim in this paper is to 
embrace this diversity within Bitcoin (and blockchain technology more generally), and 
thereby to provide a critical analysis of the Bitcoin phenomenon that reflects these 
different nuances.  
 
The article contains four sections. In the first section, I argue that Bitcoin expresses two 
forms of monetary disintermediation that are closely associated with this moment in the 
history of money, namely, its separation from banks and the state. Both forms of 
disintermediation underline the political appeal of Bitcoin, but as I explain in the second 
section, the ideology behind Bitcoin is essentially that it removes politics from money 
altogether – hence the strong parallels between Bitcoiners and goldbugs, for example. In 
the third section, I subject this claim to critical scrutiny by exploring the nature of 
Bitcoin as a social space, showing that the currency has many characteristics that the 
ideology behind it would seek to deny, such as social organization, political hierarchy and 
even trust. Building on this critique in the paper’s fourth section, I consider some 
alternatives to Bitcoin that claim to offer solutions to some of the issues already 
identified. Here, the idea of a ‘permissioned’ blockchain that operates without money will 
come to the fore. I conclude by clarifying what Bitcoin really means for our 
understanding of the social life – and future – of money. 
 
My core thesis is that there is a paradox at the heart of the Bitcoin phenomenon. Bitcoin 
will succeed as money to the extent that it fails as an ideology. The currency relies on that 
which the ideology underpinning it seeks to deny, namely, the dependence of money 
upon social relations, and upon trust. Insofar as Bitcoin has been successful qua money, 
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it is because of the community that has grown up around it. Ironically, however, this 
community is sustained by the commonly held belief that Bitcoin has replaced social 
relations – the trust on which all forms of money depend – with machine code. This 
belief is a fiction. Bitcoin has thrived despite, not because of, its reliance upon machines. If 
ever there was a form of money that validates Simmel’s description of money as a claim 
upon society, it is Bitcoin, the very currency that was set up in denial of that conception.  
 
1 Bitcoin and the Disintermediation of Money 
 
Bitcoin was launched in January 2009, using open-source software, as a peer-to-peer 
payments network. Bitcoins are created within the network, and their creation is strictly 
controlled without being governed by a central issuing authority. The network is 
programmed to ensure that the total number of Bitcoins in existence will never exceed 
21 million: half of that total supply was generated by 2013. Bitcoins are created through 
dedicated rigs (PCs), which mine for new coins through a series of tasks that require 
considerable computational power. The network is designed to produce a fixed number 
of Bitcoins per unit of time: 25 new Bitcoins will be generated every ten minutes until 
2017, and that number will subsequently be halved every four years after that. The more 
people (or rigs) there are mining for coins, the harder they will be to produce: now, only 
the most powerful rigs, i.e., several computers working together, are able to create new 
coins. Bitcoin transactions are rendered both anonymous and secure through the block 
chain, which is a database of transactions that is shared by all nodes that are participating 
in the system. So to be clear, the network does two things simultaneously: first, it mines 
for coins by solving cryptographic problems; and second, it listens for transactions, 
which are processed and confirmed by being included in a block, which is then added to 
the blockchain – rather like a rolling spreadsheet that is shared and maintained by the 
network as a whole. Any discussion about the future of Bitcoin needs to distinguish 
between these functions, because it is conceivable that a blockchain may be set up that 
does not involve the production of coins at all (Eris industries has introduced such a 
system, as I discuss later on).  
 
Since its launch, the Bitcoin network has grown rapidly to become the most widely used 
alternative money system. Various retailers of material goods, music download websites, 
game providers, gambling sites, software providers, and high-profile online businesses 
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such as Expedia, WordPress, Reddit, Namecheap, and Mega, accept Bitcoins. The 
bitcoinstore.com sells a wide range of consumer goods. There are Bitcoin gift cards, 
dedicated payment system and debit cards, and a series of exchanges (such as Bitcoin-
Central and Bitcoin-24.com) in which Bitcoins can be traded for major currencies in real 
time. However, much of the public attention that Bitcoin has attracted is connected to a 
feature that makes it less useful as a means of payment, namely its price volatility. While 
Bitcoin may be used to buy things, those things are usually priced in a currency such as 
the US dollar, for the simple reason that the price of Bitcoin has been unstable. 
Realistically, it seems highly unlikely – almost impossible – to imagine that Bitcoin will 
ever replace state currency, or even that it will become mainstream. Should it do so, as 
currently designed the deflationary consequences would be severe. It is also easy to over-
estimate Bitcoin’s impact outside of our own internet-savvy circles: according to an 
ongoing survey conducted in the US, popular awareness of Bitcoin remains low: as of 
April 2015, 65% of those surveyed said they were not familiar with Bitcoin, and only 
4.5% had ever used it.6 
 
Historically, proposals to reform the monetary system typically involve two kinds of 
disintermediation of money: from banks, and from the state. Some aim only for one of 
these” for example, the idea of ‘100 per cent money’ (echoed more recently by – among 
others – the Positive Money campaign in the UK,7 Gode Penge in Denmark,8 Fair 
Money in Australia,9 and Betra Peningakerfi in Iceland10) followed the Chicago Plan first 
conceived by Frederick Soddy during the 1920s (Soddy, 1926, 1933, 1943) and 
subsequently advocated by Irving Fisher (Fischer, 1935, 1936) and Henry Simons 
(Simons et al, 1933) in the aftermath of the Great Depression sought to take the right to 
produce money away from banks, 11  while Hayek’s (Hayek, 1976) proposals for 
denationalizing money (echoed more recently by various proposals for ‘monetary 
freedom’ or ‘free market money’) aimed at disconnecting money’s production from the 
state. Bitcoin aims at both forms of disintermediation (Karlstrøm, 2014: 28), and it is the 
promise of both that accounts for a substantial amount of its political appeal. Bitcoin 
attracts a range of supporters not least because both aspects of monetary 
disintermediation – separating money from both banks and the state – resonates with two 
major axes of political debate about the relationship between finance and the state. It 
seems obvious that much of Bitcoin’s impact is due to the 2008 financial crisis – 
although as we shall see, its roots long predate the crisis. Public interest in Bitcoin 
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resonates with debates about the nature of money and banking that were triggered by the 
2008 crisis. For all their political diversity, Bitcoiners seem to unite around the common 
view that there are major problems with our existing monetary system, which require 
radical solutions, not piecemeal reform. This is the political conversation that sustains 
Bitcoin. Bitcoin therefore feeds on the same vein of discontentment as Positive Money 
in the UK, which argues that banks should be deprived of their right to create money 
through lending. But there is a crucial issue that sets Bitcoin apart from the arrangements 
envisaged by advocates of schemes such as the Chicago Plan and Positive Money. 
Whereas those who support Positive Money argue that money’s creation should be 
placed in the hands of a politically accountable central bank committee (hence we would 
have something they call “sovereign money”), Bitcoiners believe that only technology 
can be trusted to do such an important job.12  
 
Bitcoin appeals to the political sentiments of those who are troubled by the power and 
influence of the so-called Wall Street System, and more specifically, are critical of the 
fractional reserve system that enables high-street banks to create money whenever they 
make a loan.13 From this perspective, the problem with our current monetary system is 
the way that it ties the production of money systemically to the production of debt. 
Bitcoin thus appeals to those who regard debt as morally, economically and politically 
problematic. Bitcoiners are not simply opposed to banks, though. Many of them have 
major issues with the state, too. Arguably, this is Bitcoin’s biggest source of public 
notoriety, fuelled by Silk Road, the website through which one could buy drugs and 
pornography, free from state regulation. This, perhaps, explains Bitcoin’s in a post-2001 
world: it seems to be the antithesis of the state’s increasing use, post-9/11, of the 
mainstream financial system for security purposes (see de Goede, 2012). Bitcoin and 
other forms of cryptocurrency are particularly attractive to those with libertarian and/or 
anarchist sympathies who want to see money removed from the control of government. 
According to David Golumbia, Bitcoin’s appeal is indeed mainly political, attracting those 
who sympathize with “the profoundly ideological and overtly conspiratorial anti-Central 
Bank rhetoric propagated by the extremist right in the U.S. from as far back as the 
Liberty Lobby and the John Birch Society” (2015: 119).  
 
It would be mistaken, however, to homogenize Bitcoin in political terms. While 
Golumbia’s analysis of Bitcoin as a manifestation of “distributed right-wing extremism” 
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captures the politics of some of its advocates, this is an unnecessarily one-sided view. For 
example, one might just as easily view Bitcoin in anarchist terms, as a direct descendent 
of the Cyberphunks, while its genealogy can also be traced back through the work of 
David Chaum in the 1980s, Wei Dai’s b money and Nick Szabo’s idea of bit gold (Dodd, 
2014: 363-4). Bitcoin, in other words, can be many things politically. As Maurer et al 
suggest: “In the world of Bitcoin there are goldbugs, hippies, anarchists, cyberpunks, 
cryptographers, payment systems experts, currency activists, commodity traders, and the 
curious” (2013: 2).  
 
Bitcoin is arguably a social movement as much as it is a currency – albeit a movement that 
remains diffuse and ill defined. But whichever political direction one approaches it from, 
protest seems to be a crucial unifying factor in what nurtures and sustains Bitcoin. From a 
narrower monetary perspective, the reasoning behind most forms of overtly political 
support for Bitcoin – libertarian as much as anarchist – is that governments cannot be 
trusted to resist increasing the money supply when political expediency demands, even if 
it results in high inflation. The prominent Bitcoin investor, Roger Ver, offers a fairly 
extreme version of this perspective when he argues that “Bitcoin will prevent 
governments from being able to just print money at will and then use that to buy tanks 
and guns and bombs to murder people around the world”.14  
 
Bitcoin’s connections with arguments about personal privacy and freedom are also 
important in this context.  According to Brett Scott, Bitcoin plays an important symbolic 
role as a “counterpower” to the Wall Street System – irrespective of the exact political 
reasons one has for being supportive of or suspicious towards the new currency itself. 
One significant reason for this, he argues, is that in the UK fort example, where around 
97% of money in circulation consists of money issued by commercial banks, “every 
single one of your transactions becomes a potential piece of data to be monitored, 
incrementally building up a database of your personal characteristics”.15 In such a world, 
Bitcoin – like cash – offers privacy, and freedom from the clutches of “big data”. In 
these terms, Bitcoin’s genealogy can also be traced back, beyond money, towards 
projects that grew up alongside the Internet itself, which were primarily concerned with 
responding to the emergence of digital society and its myriad challenges for governance 
and participation. This was a response to the “dataification of everything” (Clippinger 
and Bollier, 2014: xii), that is to say, the growth of a new ecology of data in which almost 
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anything – identities, currencies, contracts, genome, goods and services, etc. – can 
become a digital asset. In such a world, the capacity of the Internet to transcend extant 
regulatory boundaries – as defined by national borders, for example – is fraught with 
risk, as failures of security and privacy are capable of having a direct and serious impact 
on critical infrastructure. According to Clippinger and Bollier, existing – largely 
centralized, physical and human-dependent – solutions to such problems no longer seem 
to work in the face of such risks: “it is not possible, indeed, even necessary, to make such 
processes digital, algorithmic, autonomous, transparent and self-correcting” (2014: xiii). 
Bitcoin, and more specifically the distributed ledger that is sustained by the blockchain 
that underpins it, offers a resilient solution to these problems. In this sense, the broader 
appeal of Bitcoin is not simply that it takes money away from the control of banks and 
states, but that it removes politics from the production and management of money altogether. As I 
move on to argue in the next section, it is in this sense, particularly, that I would refer to 
Bitcoin as utopian. 
 
2 Bitcoin as Techno-Utopia 
 
Like many forms of money, from the Brixton Pound to the Euro, Bitcoin is underpinned 
by a series of assumptions about the organization of society, and the role that money 
plays within it. Some of these assumptions are about how the monetary form in question 
might contribute to social reform, or in the case of the Euro, to greater levels of social 
integration and enhanced forms of social identity. But in one crucial respect, Bitcoin is 
different from other alternative or complementary currencies;16 indeed it is different 
from any extant form of money. Unlike those other forms of money, Bitcoin seeks to 
achieve its aims by technological means. Some of these aims are purely technical, so for 
example, while it is usually up to institutions like central banks and the IMF – or in the 
case of a local currency, a board of trustees – to protect the value of money, Bitcoin 
delegates the task to machines. But in addition, Bitcoin is associated with beliefs about the 
efficacy of technology per se as a means of bypassing politics altogether.  
 
According to Satoshi Nakamoto (the anonymous individual or collective from whose 
paper the Bitcoin project was derived), the root problem with most conventional forms 
of money is the trust in a central form of authority that’s required to make them work17 
Nakamoto’s proposals sought to get rid of this central authority by using a block chain 
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(shared by all computers or nodes within the network) through which the transaction 
history of each coin could be publicly known. Privacy would be maintained, meanwhile, 
by encrypting the public keys. (Most Bitcoins are not really coins, of course: this is a 
ledger-based system.) Nakamoto’s idea has captured the imagination of a wide range of 
people. At its heart are four very seductive ideas: first, the Bitcoin network is decentred 
and flat – with no hierarchy and no single point of authority; second, Bitcoin offers 
reliable technological solutions to key problems of monetary governance, such as 
inflation; third, Bitcoin dispenses with the need to trust others, whether they are experts, 
politicians or ordinary people; and fourth, Bitcoin is debt free money, just like gold. 
 
Public discourse about Bitcoin often focuses on the idea that this is money created out of 
nothing – virtual rather than real money.18 But as even a casual glance at the specialist 
monetary literature will tell you, there is nothing unusual about this – all money is 
‘virtual’ in the sense that it relies upon the series of claims and obligations in which it is 
embedded (see Dodd, 1994, 2014; Hart, 1986, 2001; Ingham, 1996, 2004; Graeber, 2001, 
2011; Desan, 2014). Here, though, Bitcoin presents something of a paradox for the 
theory of money. While Bitcoin is no exception to the argument that all money is virtual 
– it, too, relies on honoring generalized claims to payment – the theory behind it relies 
on a form of reasoning derived from the opposing theory of money, i.e. that money 
gains its value from its material properties as a medium of exchange. Indeed, one key 
aspect of Bitcoin’s appeal to its advocates and supporters qua money – and an important 
reason for its rising price up until recently – is that the currency effectively mimics the 
properties of gold in virtual form. Maurer et al characterize the philosophy behind Bitcoin as a 
form of “digital metallism” that relies on the semiotics of metallic money, with its 
language of mining and rigs (Maurer et al, 2013). One of the most interesting things 
about Bitcoin is the material paraphernalia that supports it, and the materialistic language 
that justifies it. This speaks to a paradigmatic distinction within the theory of money 
between credit money (i.e. a claim to future payment; see Orléan, 2014, chapter 5) and 
species money (i.e. coin or bullion). It does indeed seem that Bitcoins are being dug up 
from the ground.19 It is the natural limits of supply that underpins the argument that gold 
should be money, because governments or banks cannot artificially increase its supply. 
As Maurer and his colleagues point out, it was this philosophy that led Locke to associate 
sound money with liberty, because it emancipated money from government control. 
Thus while the ideology behind Bitcoin is libertarian, the theory of money that informs it 
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can be traced back to Menger (1892). An image of money as a thing that must be kept 
scarce – in order for its value to be protected – unites these phenomena. If money is a 
social process as Simmel suggests, it seems that nothing could be farther from that idea 
than Bitcoin. 
 
These inconsistencies emerge quite clearly in the talk of Bitcoin users (both miners and 
traders) themselves, and it is fascinating to see how they are dealt with. When I asked a 
Bitcoin trader about the theory of money underlying his understanding of 
cryptocurrency, he compared Bitcoin to gold; indeed he suggested that the currency was 
superior to gold because its supply could be absolutely fixed (at 21 million coins) by the 
underlying software. At the same time, he conceded that it is possible for the chief 
scientist at Bitcoin to remove the cap on Bitcoin production, for example by doubling 
the total number of Bitcoins that will eventually be mined to 42 million. For many 
observers this might well be a good thing, because it would relieve what look like 
inherently deflationary pressures within the system, or even because it would enable the 
system to be “managed” according to prevailing economic conditions, like a 
conventional monetary system. However, such move would undermine the techno-
utopian ideals that are so important to Bitcoin, which hinge on the argument that the 
supply of Bitcoin can never be altered. When I put this point to the trader in a question, 
he suggested that the belief that the total number of Bitcoin would never exceed 21 
million that acts like a socially necessary fiction that holds the network together. In other 
words, while the chief scientist at Bitcoin could indeed raise the cap, he was highly 
unlikely to do so because such an action would shatter the belief-system that sustains the 
network itself. In other words, the trader I was speaking to appears to behave like a gold 
bug, while thinking like a social constructionist. He saw no contradiction in his position.  
 
One cannot help but think of Polanyi here, who argued the only way of realizing the 
“stark utopia” (Polanyi 1957b: 218, 250) of the self-adjusting market was through the 
support of a strong interventionist state. He wittily describes this system as planned 
laissez-faire capitalism: “There was nothing natural about laissez-faire, free markets could 
never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course . . . laissez-
faire itself was enforced by the state” (Polanyi 1957b: 145). Much the same could be said 
of the idea of Bitcoin as a monetary space that has built-in scarcity: it is a techno-utopia 
that must be embedded within a set of social practices that are sustained by strong 
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beliefs. One could also compare the “socially necessary fiction” of Bitcoin’s finite supply 
to the fictions that arguably sustain the idea of monetary policy as something largely 
technical, not political, and of central banks as institutions operating independently of 
government (see Ingham, 2004). As I move on to argue in the next section, this is a 





3 Bitcoin as a Social Space 
 
I have suggested that Bitcoin’s appeal to its advocates and users rests partly on its 
association with two kinds of monetary disintermediation: from banks on the one hand, 
and from states on the other. In this section, I want to argue that there is a fundamental 
and widespread confusion in relation to Bitcoin concerning a third form of 
disintermediation of money, namely, from hierarchical modes of society and social 
organization. As noted above, Bitcoin appeals to many users as a techno-utopia that is free 
from politics altogether. In purely technical terms, this suggests that Bitcoin is a currency 
whose supply is governed by technology, and which therefore has similar properties – 
qua money – to gold. But there is also a strong sociological thesis running through 
Bitcoin, which holds that Bitcoin is characterized by a horizontal – decentered, or 
distributed – mode of organization. Arguably, it is the notion of distributing power 
throughout the network of computers – and, just as importantly, distributing the record 
of transactions throughout the network by means of the blockchain – is perhaps the 
most important of Bitcoin’s utopian aspects, and one that can be separated from the 
(various) theories of money that are associated with it. Herein lies one important aspect 
of Bitcoin’s significance that has both political and financial implications, because 
curiously, the theory behind the currency attracts interest as both a (quasi-anarchist) 
monetary means of escaping state surveillance, and as a financial asset (or store of value) 
that has the potential not only to rival but to surpass gold. This, however, is where a gulf 
opens up between the ideology behind Bitcoin and the practical reality of its operation – 
and where the three stories with which this paper began momentarily collide. 
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When it comes to Bitcoin’s horizontalism, Brett Scott captured some of what is at stake 
when he once suggested that Bitcoin embodies a “Rousseauean” approach to finance, 
which can be contrasted to the old, “Hobbesian” world of central banks. In other words, 
Bitcoin has replaced the sovereign with the general will: “In place of a centralised, 
hierarchical group of banks keeping score of the money, a decentralised network of 
individuals records every transaction on a virtual ledger called the blockchain”.20 Scott 
subsequently qualified that view by suggesting that Bitcoin might also be seen as a 
“Techno-Leviathan”, which he defines as “a deified crypto-sovereign whose rules we can 
contract to”.21 This is not a contradiction in Scott’s interpretation of Bitcoin, but rather a 
reflection of its own peculiar ambiguous properties, as a network that sits somewhere 
between, on the one hand, a structureless, quasi-anarchist, quasi-libertarian space that is 
free from state regulation – much as celebrated in the “Declaration of Bitcoin’s 
Independence” with which this paper began – and on the other, a system that simply 
replaces human agency, and therefore human autonomy, with machine code. Arguably, 
Bitcoin’s essential strangeness – and the difficulty we have in defining it sociologically –is 
that it fits both descriptions up to a point. But the argument cannot be left here, because 
there is much more to Bitcoin than can be gleaned from focusing on its technological 
features alone. 
 
If it were true that Bitcoin has replaced a Hobbesian monetary system with one that 
could have been derived from Rousseau, it must follow that the general will has been 
abstracted from social networks and embedded in computer code. This, essentially, 
seems to be the view taken by Maurer, Nelms and Swartz. According to them, with 
Bitcoin the sociality we would normally associate with trust has been embedded 
computer code: 
 
Bitcoin provides a useful reflection on the sociality of money, despite its 
embedding of that sociality of trust in its code itself. In this world, there is no 
final settlement – as with a state demanding payment in the form of taxes or 
tribute – and trust in the code substitutes for the (socially and politically constituted) credibility 
of persons, institutions, and governments. It is this – not the anonymity or the cryptography or 
the economics – that makes Bitcoin novel in the long conversation about the nature 
of money” (Maurer et. al., 2013: 3) 
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If this is right, Bitcoin would resemble robot money, circulating in a robot society. But 
for all of its value as a reading of the significance of Bitcoin for the theory of money, I 
want to suggest that this particular reading of Bitcoin – as a horizontal network that 
simply embeds trust into computer code – misses some crucial aspects of the reality of 
Bitcoin’s actual operation, and replicates the ideology behind it. As with all complex 
technical systems, social practices are crucial.  Let me take two of the main arguments 
about Bitcoin: the first is a about its horizontalism; the second is about its social reality. 
 
Politically, it tends to be as means, as much as an end, that horizontalism matters. In his 
book on Occupy and the Arab Spring, the English journalist Paul Mason describes this 
in terms of the distinction between network and hierarchy. Social media such as Twitter 
epitomize the world of the network, governed not by central sources of authority but by 
the wisdom of crowds (Mason, 2012). Likewise, David Graeber has drawn attention to 
horizontalism as one of the defining features of Occupy’s strategy. He also finds 
evidence of it in Argentina after its 2001 crisis – in which, of course, alternative 
currencies played a key role (Graeber, 2013). Perhaps the ultimate financial expression of 
the wisdom of crowds is P2P lending, while the fast-growing sharing economy – couch 
surfing, for example – has taken the principle into the consumer world. Bitcoin seems to 
belong to this world. The only caveat is that it is meant to have automated the crowd. 
 
However, while Bitcoin resonates with the anarchist or libertarian idea of rigging up a 
machine to create a DIY currency, the argument for its horizontalism is undermined by 
the way the system operates in practice, because it incentivizes the most powerful 
producers of the currency to become even more powerful. This is not about wealth 
concentration, but monetary production. If someone – say, a Winklevoss twin – chooses 
to accumulate a large percentage of Bitcoin by buying them on the open market, this tells 
us nothing about the world that we do not already know. What matters, however, is that 
Bitcoin’s production is being dominated by a very small number of mining pools, indeed 
the software favours the most powerful producers and incentivizes monopolistic 
practices. If you want to mine for Bitcoin, your best – and perhaps only – chance of 
doing so successfully is to join such a pool, for example by renting space on a larger 
mining rig (for an example of his this works, see https://ghash.io/).  This means that the 
Bitcoin network is not quite as “distributed” as its advocates claim, indeed one could 
argue that it demonstrates quite a strong tendency towards the centralization of monetary 
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production by massively favouring those with more processing power. Reinforcing the 
incentives, rewards are scaled: the rewarded block is split according to processing power. 
It is mathematically possible for one miner (or mining pool) with enormous processing 
power to monopolize the creation of new coins. If this were to happen, Bitcoin would 
resemble the most hierarchical monetary system imaginable, indeed it would make most 
existing monetary systems (wherein money is created through commercial bank lending) 
look ‘flat’ by comparison. It is ironic, but significant, that this is a result of technical 
features of Bitcoin’s design. I say significant, because it suggests that another 
cryptocurrency with a new design might avoid this tendency to concentrate monetary 
production so much – which is exactly what designers of other altcoins, such as Litecoin 
and Dogecoin, have been claiming. In response to such dynamics, more egalitarian 
Bitcoin enthusiasts have developed Bitcoin Scrypt (http://bitcoinscrypt.org/), which is 
committed to ‘Mining Decentralization’. This contrast between the dynamics of mining 
pools (where relative size is rewarded proportionately) versus mining decentralization is 
ideologically charged. What looks like an apolitical technological network from a distance 
becomes socially nuanced and politically loaded once one starts looking at who is mining, 
where, with whom and with what. 
 
Despite the claim that Bitcoin is a horizontal network, which is politics-free because it 
distributes the power of money creation, the currency is characterized by a strikingly high 
degree of political hierarchy and social organization. The currency has not lived up to the 
techno-hype surrounding it. This further underlines the importance of looking beyond 
Bitcoin when considering the potential role of cryptocurrencies in the future of money. 
In this regard, Bitcoin tells us something important about the relationship between 
technology and the social context of its use. Technology cannot enact social organization 
on its own. As a form of money, Bitcoin has been sustained by sociological 
characteristics – e.g. structure, leadership, hierarchy, friendship and community – much 
more than it has evaded them. This is no bad thing, and it is surely no surprise to any 
sociologist or anthropologist of money. My point is simply that the reality of Bitcoin – its 
social reality – is at odds with the theory behind it. A system that originally appealed 
because of its distributed qualities is in some ways rather centralized.  
  
Calling Bitcoin horizontalist renders it sociologically anaemic, buying into the ideology 
that it is essentially a machine.  On the contrary, there is a strong sense of community 
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around Bitcoin, as reflected in discussion groups, Internet forums and the organizations 
that are associated with it. In monetary terms, one could argue that the community 
around Bitcoin is still an important source of the disembedded trust that characterizes 
the currency itself. Besides the issue of horizontalism, there is also the social reality of 
Bitcoin itself as a social space to consider. Bitcoin may be a virtual currency whose 
production is carried out by a computer network, but those who use it often express 
quite a strong sense of collective identity: far stronger, one might say, that one finds in 
the case of mainstream currencies such as the Euro or pound sterling. Bitcoiners 
demonstrate quite a strong sense of community, with regular meetings bolstering (and 
bolstered by) quite intense participation in online forums. One Bitcoin trader I spoke to 
reported that he usually mixed with his counterparties following a trade on Skype, often 
during the ten minutes it takes for the blockchain to be produced (and thus the 
transaction he had just participated in to be recorded across the distributed ledger). This 
was, he suggested, a great opportunity to socialize. I asked him what he and his fellow 
traders tended to talk about: “Money ”, he replied. 
 
4 Bitcoin 2.0: A Blockchain Without Coins? 
 
While some of Bitcoin’s supporters still celebrate it as a currency that can overcome 
difficulties arising in conventional monetary and payment systems whenever trust breaks 
down (or is breached), many others accept that whatever form it takes, money will always 
require trust simply for people to accept it as payment. Just to be clear on this question, 
Nakamoto was specifically referring to two aspects of monetary trust: first, the trust we 
place in the monetary policy makers – central bankers, for example – to act responsibly; 
and second, in the specific context of digital currency, the trust we need to place in one 
another not to double spend. These are critically important aspects of Bitcoin today, 
indeed they point to two separate development trajectories in Bitcoin’s future. The first 
relates directly to money. Although it is open to debate whether fiat monetary systems 
have been undermined by a reliance on trust, Nakamoto was arguably right to criticize a 
system that enables banks to lend money “out in waves … with barely a fraction in 
reserve”.22 In this sense, Bitcoin is in tune with political sentiments that emerged after the 
2008 financial crisis (see Dodd 2014). The second trust issue points to wider applications 
of blockchain technology beyond money. The idea of keeping failsafe records through a 
distributed network that does not rely on trusted (but potentially inefficient, corrupt or 
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incompetent) intermediaries is perhaps the most radical aspect of Bitcoin, and will be 
pivotal to a future that will be much broader than money alone. 
 
Bitcoin gained much of its early notoriety from associations with Silk Road, the online 
marketplace (now closed) on which it was possible to buy illicit goods such as drugs, 
pornography and arms. Bitcoin has also been associated with money laundering, and it is 
notable that the report on Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies recently published by HM 
Treasury in the UK focused almost exclusively on anti-money laundering in its 
considerations as to how the currency should be regulated (HM Treasury, 2015). These 
associations with illegality gave rise to the widespread assumption that the key to 
Bitcoin’s attractiveness for its users is the anonymity it gives them (e.g. Reid and Harrigan, 
2013). This is a misconception. As readers of Bitcoin.org are told, “all Bitcoin 
transactions are stored publicly and permanently on the network, which means anyone 
can see the balance and transactions of any Bitcoin address”.23 So if you want to use 
Bitcoin anonymously, you have to ensure that nobody can connect you with the Bitcoin 
address you use: “This is one reason why Bitcoin addresses should only be used once,” 
the website helpfully adds. Seeking to ensure a more mainstream future for the currency, 
many advocates of Bitcoin have challenged its associations with criminality, mainly by 
emphasizing the fact that this is a distributed ledger on which all transactions are stored 
publicly and permanently. Bitcoin, presented in these terms, is no longer primarily a tool 
of anonymity, but rather a means of achieving transparency and trackability of data 
across a network that does not rely on a centralized agency. Every computer within the 
network logs every Bitcoin transaction; this is what the blockchain does.  
 
Conceived in these terms, Bitcoin is essentially a database of transactions that relies on a 
protocol, i.e. an agreed-upon format for transmitting data between devices. It is 
important to remember that, in relation to Bitcoin, the distributed network of computers 
that produces the currency and records all transactions that use it, carries out two tasks 
simultaneously. First, it mines for coins by solving cryptographic problems every ten 
minutes. Second, it listens for transactions, which are processed and confirmed by being 
included in a block, which is then added to the blockchain that is produced every ten 
minutes. One way of thinking about this latter process is to imagine a rolling spreadsheet, 
with each new line being added every ten minutes, containing a record of everything that 
has happened across the network during that period of time. Up until now, most of the 
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attention and debate around Bitcoin has focused on the first of these processes, i.e. the 
production of coins. Hence the focus on the price of Bitcoin, as well as on the costs of 
mining and the organizational dynamics of mining pools. The key to my argument here 
lies with the second process. 
 
Viewed solely as a distributed ledger that is effectively just a database, blockchain 
technology encourages another, epistemological utopianism that goes beyond money. 
Contrary to the infinitely copiable world of plenty we associate with digital media, the 
blockchain makes finitude and singularity possible: from the idea that money is a “thing” 
whose production can be regulated and controlled, through the notion that each of our 
actions or transactions (e.g. voting, buying property, medical vaccinations, getting 
married, receiving a degree, etc.) is a uniquely verifiable event. Jorge-Luis Borges wrote 
about philosophical – and, specifically, linguistic – aspects of a similar idea through his 
character, Funes the Memorious. Funes’s memory was so prodigious that he could recall 
each day in such painstaking detail that merely to think his recollection through would 
take an entire day. By imagining Funes, Borges’s aim was not to explore memory as such 
but rather the assumptions underlying philosophical nominalism: Funes memory would, 
he surmised, be a match for the language that Locke envisaged whereby “each individual 
thing, each stone, each bird and each branch, would have its own name” (2000: 93).  
 
This may help to explain why the blockchain is sometimes compared to a language, and 
further, why it is supported with quasi-religious zeal. The blockchain appeals not only 
because it can remember every discrete event within the network, but crucially, because 
its memory is infallible. The blockchain seems to promise a world of absolute certainty 
but with no god, or at least no central figure that could be likened to a god – and yet we 
have god-like guarantees. Moreover, and more importantly perhaps, as a form of 
memory the blockchain is distributed. To its supporters, perhaps the most important 
attraction of the blockchain as a distributed ledger is that it makes such verification 
possible without reference to an intermediary. In other words, every node within the 
network can replicate and verify Funes’s memory. The technology may be god-like but it 
is a distributed god, at least in theory.  
 
There are many possible applications of this technology, from the idea that our identities 
can be validated and secured within the blockchain without being substantively known 
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(e.g. Factom for a global application of this), through a real time gross settlement system 
for clearing payments, to a system of smart contracts used for property transfer or the 
settlement of debts. Hence blockchain technology, i.e. a distributed ledger jointly 
maintained across a network, is now being applied to various applications for storing 
data, recording transactions and agreements, and if necessary, enacting procedures on the 
basis of rules on which all participants in the system have agreed in advance. This, 
essentially, is a smart contract, defined as “computer protocols that facilitate, verify, 
execute and enforce the terms of a commercial agreement” (Swanson, 2015: 15). We 
have moved from money, to law.24 
 
The literature on smart contracts – much of it in the blogosphere, at the time of writing 
– is replete with notions such as records being “truly honest” without needing to trust 
other humans (who are flawed or may be dishonest corrupt) or institutions (which may 
not have our interests at heart, and can be hacked or politicized). The blockchain, its 
supporters claim, stops us from lying about history. This is a compelling shift of emphasis: 
far from being a tool for illegal transactions, the blockchain is now heralded as a means 
for achieving more efficient regulation, near-perfect auditing and greater transparency.25  
There is a strong realist tenor within this discourse. The fundamental idea is of a 
referencing system (i.e. the records stored within the blockchain) in which there is an 
exact one-to-one correspondence with reality, but which requires no God. The ultimate 
goal is to establish a system of records (recording everything from property transactions 
to marriages to degree awards etc.) that cannot be corrupted and does not need any third 
party to verify that what is recorded is true. This is because everything is stored in the 
blockchain, which nobody controls and nobody can tamper with. In Borges’s story about 
Funes, one of the conclusions we might draw is that Locke’s language makes it 
impossible to have categories, and without categories, genuine thought is impossible. 
One can but wonder whether this resistance to categories is one reason why the 
blockchain tends to appeal so much to individualists. 
 
Herein lies an important twist in the Bitcoin story with which I began this paper, a twist 
that even the most enthusiastic supporters of the technology did not necessarily envisage 
when the experiment began. This is the notion of a blockchain without coins, using the 
distributed ledger solely as database. While the commercial viability of potential 
offshoots of Bitcoin – all focusing on other applications of blockchain technology – has 
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been discussed almost from the outset, it was always assumed that it was necessary for 
the network to produce coins in order to incentivize people to participate, given that 
participation is costly (e.g. in terms of the energy consumed). Hence an organization such 
as Ethereum, which has its own blockchain and was launched as a direct rival to Bitcoin 
that is not designed primarily with the production of money in mind, nevertheless still 
produces its own money, known as Ether. Ethereum is one of a series of platforms – 
others include Invictus Innovations and Ripple Labs – that are collectively described as 
“Bitcoin 2.0”. 26  Almost all such platforms share the assumption that blockchain 
technology is not simply a platform for producing currency but can be used in other 
applications such as e-commerce, smart contracts and various other financial 
transactions. The crucial aspect that unites these is the absence of a central intermediary 
or middleman. The key distinguishing feature, in other words, remains focused on 
decentralization: the notion of a distributed ledger, a database simultaneously maintained 
by all nodes on the network. 
 
By contrast, the idea of a blockchain without coins – which is mainly being promoted by 
Eris Industries – seeks to overturn two traditional assumptions behind Bitcoin. The first 
is that the ledger must be open to any potential participant in order to be genuinely 
distributed. This is the contrast between a permission-less and permissioned blockchain: 
whereas the latter continues along the Bitcoin model, the latter enables the blockchain to 
be private owned and run, e.g. by a bank, with access to it controlled. The second 
assumption that is overturned by the notion of a blockchain without coins is that coins 
are necessary in order for participants to join and maintain the system. The argument 
behind Eris is that utility – not the production and transmission of monetary value – is 
reason enough to maintain a blockchain in cases where it is genuinely useful as a database. 
These two arguments come together in an interesting way when justifying the 
permissioned aspect of the coin-less blockchain, because its advocates argue that it is the 
very presence of money within Bitcoin that – much as I suggested above – sets in place a 
tendency towards centralization, e.g. by favouring those with higher processing power 
and incentivizing players to acquire more such power. While Bitcoiners argue that a 
blockchain without coins is unworkable, because there is no incentive to keeping 
maintaining the ledger, Eris argue that flexibility and utility are the only incentives we 
need. Their blockchain can be maintained by a central entity, such as a company or 
group of companies, who use the blockchain as a “low-cost, low-overhead, run-anywhere 
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infrastructure”. Moreover, they argue that by removing the monetary incentive, the 
motivation for participants to game the system is also removed. Eris further argues that a 
permissioned chain can be controlled and tailored to specific needs, and can be a tool of 




So where does all of this leave Bitcoin? Will it – or another altcoin – succeed or fail as 
money? Critics of Bitcoin complain that it is too slow for efficient payments, too 
cumbersome and energy sucking, and they see the Bitcoin Foundation as problematic. 
On the other hand, there are some 800 million pounds worth of venture capital tied up 
in Bitcoin, so it would be unwise to right it off. What surely is clear for the time being, 
however, is that Bitcoin is currently being sustained by sociological features that are 
directly at odds with the political ideology the theory of money that underpin it. These 
include leadership, social organization, social structure, sociality, utopianism and trust. 
None of these necessarily means that it will work as money: hard-headed analysis 
suggests that the Bitcoin has far less chance of succeeding as money than the blockchain 
technology, which will be (and is being) adapted for other purposes, such as Mastercoin 
and Ethereum, which are essentially smart contracts. 
 
The idea behind Bitcoin is premised on denying what I believe is Simmel’s most 
important insight into the social life of money: by treating money as a thing, not a process. 
This idea cannot withstand close scrutiny. What Bitcoin surely does confirm is that it no 
longer makes much sense to talk of money as a claim upon society if, by society, we 
essentially mean something we ‘belong’ to. This is a good reason to read Simmel, because 
was careful to avoid such a notion of society from the outset.  In his terms, money is a 
claim, if not on “society,” then on varying modes of shared existence and experience. As 
sociologists of science and technology have been arguing for a long time, technological 
artifacts cannot simply enact organizational forms on their own. Human, social, and 
political factors inevitably emerge as those who interact with and use these artifacts both 
shape and are shaped by their practical use. In Bitcoin’s case, there is a close analogy 
between the underlying view of money as a “thing” in itself and the notion that 
technology is capable of shaping a social system—in this instance, money—all by itself, 
free from human intervention. Arguably, it was faith in technological solutions to 
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information problems in the economy that enabled people to believe that credit risk 
could be managed through securitization. This was blind trust. Collateralized debt 
obligations, like Bitcoin, were underpinned by a trust in numbers that few people who 
used them actually understood.  
 
The idea of the failsafe, distributed ledger is perhaps the aspect of Bitcoin that will be key 
to a future that goes beyond money alone. This is not to say that Bitcoin has no 
relevance to the future of money, it surely does. But its role will most likely be a partial 
one (Vigna and Casey, 2015). For reasons I have discussed here, world in which all 
money is organized along the lines of Bitcoin, with money’s production strictly 
controlled, would possess a similar level of inflexibility as the world when it was geared 
to the gold standard – and as I have also argued, Bitcoin itself seems not only to replicate 
but exacerbate the self-same inequities of wealth and power that can be found in the 
existing financial system. Bitcoin, and cryptocurrencies in general, are part of a diverse 
future for money. And monetary pluralism, arguably, is ultimately more likely to bring 
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